Third Party Assistance- Conservatorship of Davis (1981)
Court of Appeal of California, Second Appellate District, Division Four October 6, 1981 Civ. No. 61112
This case was the first in a series of cases that helped cement the key practice of allow third party assistance as a clause for disproving grave disability. At the time the court applied to narrow definition of grave disability which precluded any third party assistance. As cited in a later case, (conservatorship of Wilson) no one in society mentally ill or not lives without some form of assistance from others. Conservatorship of Davis was the first to address and mandate that third party assistance must be weighed by the trier of fact before a finding of grave disability be applied.
Proposed conservatee was awaiting a hearing establishing a LPS conservatorship over her person. She demanded a jury trial upon appointment of an LPS conservator over her person. The jury trial found he not gravely disabled by a unanimous vote. She was subsequently ordered to be discharged. The appellant public conservator appealed upon judgement.
The conservatee, Davis had been living with her husband for 18 years. During the time of her mental decompensation, she had
"begun to change," resigning her job because she felt her coworkers were talking about her behind her back. Shortly after that he observed a diminution in her ability to cook, drive a car, and handle funds responsibly. She became delusional and her eating, sleeping and certain other habits changed and became grossly bizarre.
Her husband submitted statements that conservatee was welcome to live in his home. Upon examination by a psychiatrist, he concurred that the conservatee was not in a state of remission but her active symptoms were being controlled by medication. He opined that she suffered from paranoid schizophrenia at the time. Conservatee at the time had never attempted to leave AWOL. She told him that she would continue to take her medication at home. The psychiatrist believed that despite her statement, it would not last should she be discharged. In regards to whether conservatee was currently gravely disabled he found that she was mentally ill but did not reach the level of grave disability. She answered in a manner consistent with some who was intact and oriented 3x.
She was able to answer all of Dr. Sharma's questions pertaining to food, clothing and shelter in a manner he would expect them to be answered by a person not gravely disabled and who would be able to provide those necessities. Respondent told Dr. Sharma she did not work and that her husband had been supporting her for at least two or three years.
He opined that given that she was a housewife it was not unreasonable to cite her dependency on her husband as a sign of grave disability. She appeared to be well dressed and taking care of her ADLs, demonstrating that she could care for her personal needs with no effort.
Conservatee cited that her "noncompliance" stems from wanting to change medication and stop a side effect of walking too much. She cites how she was now content with the medication and its effects and promises that she would continue with treatment if discharged.
Appellant conservator holds several contentions with the court. The public conservator cites that first the trial court committed prejudicial error by instructing the jury with partial instructions. Appellant asked that the jury be instructed with instructions 2, 2a, and 8. The trial judge instructed the jury in two out of the three instructions required. Appellant contends that the court committed error by omitting instruction 8.
2a reads as follows: "You are instructed that if you find that Mary Davis is capable of surviving safely in freedom by herself or with the help of willing and responsible family members or friends you shall find that she is not gravely disabled."
2 reads as follows: "You are instructed that before you may consider whether Mary Davis is gravely disabled you must first find that she is, as a result of a mental disorder, unwilling or unable to accept treatment for that mental disorder on a voluntary basis. If you find that Mary Davis is capable of understanding her need for treatment for any mental disorder she may have and capable of making a meaningful commitment to a plan of treatment of that disorder she is entitled to a verdict of 'not gravely disabled.'" [124 Cal. App. 3d 320]
8 reads as follows: "The fact that respondent's family is or is not amenable to having respondent reside in their home is not determinative of whether respondent is capable of providing herself with food, clothing or shelter."
Because of omission of instruction 8 appellant conservator contends that the court failed to give an additional element in appellant's case. One issue does lie with citing Conservatorship of Buchanan is that case has been de published and is no longer citable.* Conservator cites that
In Buchanan, supra, 78 Cal. App. 3d 281, the court of appeal reasoned that because this statute contains no language indicating that where third parties can provide the basic necessities of life no "grave disability" exists, a trial court did not err in refusing to instruct a jury that "One is not gravely disabled either if he/she is capable of surviving on his/her own or with the help of willing and responsible third parties. Such third parties include relatives, friends, community agencies, and board and care facilities."
The public conservator contends that the legislature did not explicitly state third party assistance in its clause, the trial court in that case did not err in refusing to add jury instruction about third party assistance. The court rebuts that despite the lack of wording about third party assistance, the law allows for interpretation of assistance and that it is not excluded in its entirety.
The court in Buchanan rebuts that despite the lack of wording about third party assistance, the court does find that Welf and Inst Code § 5001 stems from probate code § 1701 which vests the power to decide whether a conservatee is in need of the services of a conservator up to the court. In the matter of whether the conservatee is gravely disabled that trier of fact may be a panel of jury members. The court added that if the jury instructions were correct then
The proposed instruction would not only confuse the trier of fact as to its proper role, but infringes upon the powers reserved by statute to the court's discretion, namely, the course of treatment.
And this alone would infringe upon the court’s discretion as laid forth in Probate code. Drawing from that case, the public conservator argues that it is the court’s discretion when it comes to deciding if a conservator is needed and only a jury may be involved in the deciding factor of grave disability.
However, the appellate court in the matter of Davis cite Supreme Court in Moyer v. Workmen's Compensation Appeals Bd. (1973) 10 Cal. 3d 222, 230-231 [110 Cal. Rptr. 144, 514 P.2d 1224]:
"We begin with the fundamental rule that a court 'should ascertain the intent of the Legislature so as to effectuate the purpose of the law.' [Citation.] In determining such intent '[t]he court turns first to the words themselves for the answer.' [Citation.] We are required to give effect to statutes 'according to the usual, ordinary import of the language employed in framing them.' [Citations.] 'If possible, significance should be given to every word, phrase, sentence and part of an act in pursuance of the legislative purpose.' [Citation.] '[A] construction making some words surplusage is to be avoided.' [Citation.] 'When used in a statute [words] must be construed in context, keeping in mind the nature and obvious purpose of the statute where they appear.' [Citations.] Moreover, the various parts of a statutory enactment must be harmonized by considering the particular clause or section in the context of the statutory framework as a whole." (See alsoTripp v. Swoap (1976) 17 Cal. 3d 671, 679 [131 Cal. Rptr. 789, 552 P.2d 749] and People v. Untiedt (1974) 42 Cal. App. 3d 550, 554 [116 Cal. Rptr. 899].)
In effect the court is using this case to highlight the matter that the court has a due responsibility to interpret the intent of the legislature. The court should strive to use any wording to create a judgment. Discretion should be applied to ensure that the meaning of words is carefully analyzed within the context of the case and that hasty generalizations should be avoided.
Drawing from that conclusion the court found that with proper extrapolation and analysis of the law, the jury instructions for the petitioner were in fact false and that instruction 8 was not to have been omitted. The court explains its reasoning below.
5001 of the act that intent is:
"(a) To end the inappropriate, indefinite, and involuntary commitment of mentally disordered persons, developmentally disabled persons, [124 Cal. App. 3d 322] and persons impaired by chronic alcoholism, and to eliminate legal disabilities;
"(b) To provide prompt evaluation and treatment of persons with serious mental disorders or impaired by chronic alcoholism;
"(c) To guarantee and protect public safety;
"(d) To safeguard individual rights through judicial review;
"(e) To provide individualized treatment, supervision, and placement services by a conservatorship program for gravely disabled persons;
"(f) To encourage the full use of all existing agencies, professional personnel and public funds to accomplish these objectives and to prevent duplication of services and unnecessary expenditures;
"(g) To protect mentally disordered persons and developmentally disabled persons from criminal acts.”
The court needs to examine the section carefully for meaning and context to properly sustain their previous argument. In its examination the court found that the first part § 5354 and § 5350 do not contain any information about who may make such an assessment of the contents of the jury report. It does not specify whether judge or jury may review the documents.
The next aspect of §5350, the matter to be tried, grave disability, also does not contain any information about what aspects of grave disability may be discussed. It does not speak of whether placement, conservator, or treatment may be excluded in rendering a judgement. Which begs an interesting question as the case of Manton found that jury trials exclude the conservatorship investigation report from jury trials on matter of hearsay. However, the Manton decision came a few years after Davis.
"whether [the person] is gravely disabled," it appears from a reading of the entire act that this phrase must be broadly construed to include the determination of whether the establishment of a conservatorship is necessary in light of all the relevant facts.
The appellate court also begged the matter of preserving all civil liberties
"the interests involved in civil commitment proceedings are no less fundamental than those in criminal proceedings and ... liberty is no less precious because forfeited in a civil proceeding than when taken as a consequence of a criminal conviction." (In re Gary W. (1971) 5 Cal. 3d 296, 307 [96 Cal. Rptr. 1, 486 P.2d 1201]; People v. Feagley (1975) 14 Cal. 3d 338, 351 [121 Cal. Rptr. 509, 535 P.2d 373].)
"Indeed, a conservatee may be subjected to greater control of his or her life than one convicted of a crime" (Conservatorship of Roulet (1979) 23 Cal. 3d 219, 228 [152 Cal. Rptr. 425, 590 P.2d 1]) and the stigma of a civil commitment "'"could be as socially debilitating as that of a criminal conviction."'" (Id, at p. 229.)
Because these cases were seminal in proving that civil liberties were to remain the utmost important aspect of civil commitment cases, the appellate court found that in order to maintain the spirit of these cases, the court should strive to interpret the legislature in a manner that is more permissive than restrictive. As a result, the court found that adding jury instruction 8 was not an error of the trial court.
A fortiori the nondangerous person proposed for an LPS conservatorship subject to involuntary confinement should be, and is, entitled to a jury determination of all of the essential questions involved in a trial on the question of imposing such a conservatorship.
The court added that using the Buchanan case was error in itself because it would infringe upon the conservatee’s rights. The court reminds us that in accordance to § 5001 et seq the trier of fact needs to be able to view the entire case as a whole and not just parts in a vacuum. The other moving parts of the case include:
the willingness and capability of the proposed conservatee to voluntarily accept treatment and upon consideration of whether the nondangerous individual is capable of surviving safely in freedom by himself or with the help of willing and responsible family members, friends or other third parties. (SeeO'Connor v. Donaldson (1975) 422 U.S. 563, 573-576 [45 L. Ed. 2d 396, 405-407, 95 S. Ct. 2486].)
In a separate ruling, O'Connor v. Donaldson, supra, at page 576 [45 L.Ed.2d at page 407], establishes that "... a State cannot constitutionally confine without more a nondangerous individual who is capable of surviving safely in freedom by himself or with the help of willing and responsible family members or friends."
The court finds that the Buchanan court erred in interpreting the law by finding that “and more” meant excluding to be family, friends, or third agencies.
The public conservator attempted to explain that the LPS act
unambiguously limits a jury's inquiry into whether the respondent is, as a result of a mental disorder, incapable of providing herself with food, clothing or shelter, or alternately whether the elements of WIC section [124 Cal. App. 3d 327] 5008, subdivision (h)(2) fn. 5 are met," is inconsistent with his presentation of evidence in the trial court.
The appellate court cites appellant’s testimony during cross. The court reminds that just as the report may be submitted and examined during trial, so may the testimony of any witnesses. Even if the jury was not the trier of fact a judge would be. The public conservator investigator continued to testify citing that the LPS act was an act of delegation of judicial authority.
The conservatorship investigator continues to press the point that the LPS act in the early stages of the 14 day hearings and 72 hour hold is in a manner a form of delegation of decision making. First the doctor is tasked with determining whether a patient is a danger to themselves or others and should the doctor not be able to make such a choice a referral for under Welf and Inst Code § 5350 is made and the public conservatorship investigator gains that responsibility.
The court rejects the appellant’s argument in its entirety. The court holds that the early stages of a LPS hold are ancillary to a LPS conservatorship proceeding and are not judicial in nature. The appellate court returned to its original standing that the trial court did not make an error when allowing jury instruction 8.
A minor issue but one none the less was the matter of the conservatee trying to dismiss the appeal as moot. The conservatee argues that the previous ruling by the jury is legally analogous to an acquittal for a criminal offense and trying the matter again would run afoul of the double jeopardy doctrine. The court returns stating that LPS conservatees are not entitled to double jeopardy protection.
The court reminds the conservatee that even though LPS and penal code laws are often discussed together it does not necessarily mean the same rights are extended to the LPS act. The court finds such is necessary because penal code and LPS commitment both deal with matters involving deprivation of civil liberties. The LPS act, however, is more treatment and recovery oriented so applying the double jeopardy doctrine who would be wholly inappropriate.
To speak in terms of double jeopardy as a bar in the face of such possible future changes would be singularly inappropriate to the purposes and provisions of the LPS Act. [124 Cal. App. 3d 331]
Based on the preceding argument the court has laid forth, the appellate court dismissed the appeal and affirmed the order reversing the conservatorship.
Procedural Posture
Appellant public guardian challenged the dismissal by the Superior Court of Los Angeles County (California) of his petition to establish aconservatorship under the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act, Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 5001 et seq., and a temporary conservatorship with the power, among others, to involuntarily confine in a hospital respondent, a person claimed to be gravely disabled as a result of a mental disorder.
Overview
Appellant public guardian challenged the trial court's dismissal of his petition to establish a conservatorship under the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act (LPS Act), Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 5001 et seq., claiming that the trial court erred in giving jury instructions proposed by respondent, a person claimed to be gravely disabled as a result of a mental disorder, and refusing to give appellant's proposed jury instruction. The court affirmed the trial court's dismissal, rejecting appellant's contention and concluding that a person sought to be made a conservatee subject to involuntary confinement in a mental institution under the LPS Act was entitled to have a unanimous jury determination of all of the questions involved in the imposition of such a conservatorship, and not just on the issue of grave disability in the sense of whether he or she could safely survive in freedom and be provided food, clothing or shelter unaided by willing, responsible relatives, friends or appropriate third persons. The court also rejected respondent's contention that the jury verdict must have been regarded as the functional equivalent of an acquittal of a criminal offense for the purposes of due process.
Outcome
The court affirmed the trial court's order of dismissal and denied a motion to dismiss the appeal, finding that respondent, a person claimed to be gravely disabled as a result of a mental disorder, was entitled to have a unanimous jury determination of all of the questions involved in the imposition of a conservatorship under the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act and that double jeopardy did not apply to a determination at a conservatorship trial.
Court of Appeal of California, Second Appellate District, Division Four October 6, 1981 Civ. No. 61112
This case was the first in a series of cases that helped cement the key practice of allow third party assistance as a clause for disproving grave disability. At the time the court applied to narrow definition of grave disability which precluded any third party assistance. As cited in a later case, (conservatorship of Wilson) no one in society mentally ill or not lives without some form of assistance from others. Conservatorship of Davis was the first to address and mandate that third party assistance must be weighed by the trier of fact before a finding of grave disability be applied.
Proposed conservatee was awaiting a hearing establishing a LPS conservatorship over her person. She demanded a jury trial upon appointment of an LPS conservator over her person. The jury trial found he not gravely disabled by a unanimous vote. She was subsequently ordered to be discharged. The appellant public conservator appealed upon judgement.
The conservatee, Davis had been living with her husband for 18 years. During the time of her mental decompensation, she had
"begun to change," resigning her job because she felt her coworkers were talking about her behind her back. Shortly after that he observed a diminution in her ability to cook, drive a car, and handle funds responsibly. She became delusional and her eating, sleeping and certain other habits changed and became grossly bizarre.
Her husband submitted statements that conservatee was welcome to live in his home. Upon examination by a psychiatrist, he concurred that the conservatee was not in a state of remission but her active symptoms were being controlled by medication. He opined that she suffered from paranoid schizophrenia at the time. Conservatee at the time had never attempted to leave AWOL. She told him that she would continue to take her medication at home. The psychiatrist believed that despite her statement, it would not last should she be discharged. In regards to whether conservatee was currently gravely disabled he found that she was mentally ill but did not reach the level of grave disability. She answered in a manner consistent with some who was intact and oriented 3x.
She was able to answer all of Dr. Sharma's questions pertaining to food, clothing and shelter in a manner he would expect them to be answered by a person not gravely disabled and who would be able to provide those necessities. Respondent told Dr. Sharma she did not work and that her husband had been supporting her for at least two or three years.
He opined that given that she was a housewife it was not unreasonable to cite her dependency on her husband as a sign of grave disability. She appeared to be well dressed and taking care of her ADLs, demonstrating that she could care for her personal needs with no effort.
Conservatee cited that her "noncompliance" stems from wanting to change medication and stop a side effect of walking too much. She cites how she was now content with the medication and its effects and promises that she would continue with treatment if discharged.
Appellant conservator holds several contentions with the court. The public conservator cites that first the trial court committed prejudicial error by instructing the jury with partial instructions. Appellant asked that the jury be instructed with instructions 2, 2a, and 8. The trial judge instructed the jury in two out of the three instructions required. Appellant contends that the court committed error by omitting instruction 8.
2a reads as follows: "You are instructed that if you find that Mary Davis is capable of surviving safely in freedom by herself or with the help of willing and responsible family members or friends you shall find that she is not gravely disabled."
2 reads as follows: "You are instructed that before you may consider whether Mary Davis is gravely disabled you must first find that she is, as a result of a mental disorder, unwilling or unable to accept treatment for that mental disorder on a voluntary basis. If you find that Mary Davis is capable of understanding her need for treatment for any mental disorder she may have and capable of making a meaningful commitment to a plan of treatment of that disorder she is entitled to a verdict of 'not gravely disabled.'" [124 Cal. App. 3d 320]
8 reads as follows: "The fact that respondent's family is or is not amenable to having respondent reside in their home is not determinative of whether respondent is capable of providing herself with food, clothing or shelter."
Because of omission of instruction 8 appellant conservator contends that the court failed to give an additional element in appellant's case. One issue does lie with citing Conservatorship of Buchanan is that case has been de published and is no longer citable.* Conservator cites that
In Buchanan, supra, 78 Cal. App. 3d 281, the court of appeal reasoned that because this statute contains no language indicating that where third parties can provide the basic necessities of life no "grave disability" exists, a trial court did not err in refusing to instruct a jury that "One is not gravely disabled either if he/she is capable of surviving on his/her own or with the help of willing and responsible third parties. Such third parties include relatives, friends, community agencies, and board and care facilities."
The public conservator contends that the legislature did not explicitly state third party assistance in its clause, the trial court in that case did not err in refusing to add jury instruction about third party assistance. The court rebuts that despite the lack of wording about third party assistance, the law allows for interpretation of assistance and that it is not excluded in its entirety.
The court in Buchanan rebuts that despite the lack of wording about third party assistance, the court does find that Welf and Inst Code § 5001 stems from probate code § 1701 which vests the power to decide whether a conservatee is in need of the services of a conservator up to the court. In the matter of whether the conservatee is gravely disabled that trier of fact may be a panel of jury members. The court added that if the jury instructions were correct then
The proposed instruction would not only confuse the trier of fact as to its proper role, but infringes upon the powers reserved by statute to the court's discretion, namely, the course of treatment.
And this alone would infringe upon the court’s discretion as laid forth in Probate code. Drawing from that case, the public conservator argues that it is the court’s discretion when it comes to deciding if a conservator is needed and only a jury may be involved in the deciding factor of grave disability.
However, the appellate court in the matter of Davis cite Supreme Court in Moyer v. Workmen's Compensation Appeals Bd. (1973) 10 Cal. 3d 222, 230-231 [110 Cal. Rptr. 144, 514 P.2d 1224]:
"We begin with the fundamental rule that a court 'should ascertain the intent of the Legislature so as to effectuate the purpose of the law.' [Citation.] In determining such intent '[t]he court turns first to the words themselves for the answer.' [Citation.] We are required to give effect to statutes 'according to the usual, ordinary import of the language employed in framing them.' [Citations.] 'If possible, significance should be given to every word, phrase, sentence and part of an act in pursuance of the legislative purpose.' [Citation.] '[A] construction making some words surplusage is to be avoided.' [Citation.] 'When used in a statute [words] must be construed in context, keeping in mind the nature and obvious purpose of the statute where they appear.' [Citations.] Moreover, the various parts of a statutory enactment must be harmonized by considering the particular clause or section in the context of the statutory framework as a whole." (See alsoTripp v. Swoap (1976) 17 Cal. 3d 671, 679 [131 Cal. Rptr. 789, 552 P.2d 749] and People v. Untiedt (1974) 42 Cal. App. 3d 550, 554 [116 Cal. Rptr. 899].)
In effect the court is using this case to highlight the matter that the court has a due responsibility to interpret the intent of the legislature. The court should strive to use any wording to create a judgment. Discretion should be applied to ensure that the meaning of words is carefully analyzed within the context of the case and that hasty generalizations should be avoided.
Drawing from that conclusion the court found that with proper extrapolation and analysis of the law, the jury instructions for the petitioner were in fact false and that instruction 8 was not to have been omitted. The court explains its reasoning below.
5001 of the act that intent is:
"(a) To end the inappropriate, indefinite, and involuntary commitment of mentally disordered persons, developmentally disabled persons, [124 Cal. App. 3d 322] and persons impaired by chronic alcoholism, and to eliminate legal disabilities;
"(b) To provide prompt evaluation and treatment of persons with serious mental disorders or impaired by chronic alcoholism;
"(c) To guarantee and protect public safety;
"(d) To safeguard individual rights through judicial review;
"(e) To provide individualized treatment, supervision, and placement services by a conservatorship program for gravely disabled persons;
"(f) To encourage the full use of all existing agencies, professional personnel and public funds to accomplish these objectives and to prevent duplication of services and unnecessary expenditures;
"(g) To protect mentally disordered persons and developmentally disabled persons from criminal acts.”
The court needs to examine the section carefully for meaning and context to properly sustain their previous argument. In its examination the court found that the first part § 5354 and § 5350 do not contain any information about who may make such an assessment of the contents of the jury report. It does not specify whether judge or jury may review the documents.
The next aspect of §5350, the matter to be tried, grave disability, also does not contain any information about what aspects of grave disability may be discussed. It does not speak of whether placement, conservator, or treatment may be excluded in rendering a judgement. Which begs an interesting question as the case of Manton found that jury trials exclude the conservatorship investigation report from jury trials on matter of hearsay. However, the Manton decision came a few years after Davis.
"whether [the person] is gravely disabled," it appears from a reading of the entire act that this phrase must be broadly construed to include the determination of whether the establishment of a conservatorship is necessary in light of all the relevant facts.
The appellate court also begged the matter of preserving all civil liberties
"the interests involved in civil commitment proceedings are no less fundamental than those in criminal proceedings and ... liberty is no less precious because forfeited in a civil proceeding than when taken as a consequence of a criminal conviction." (In re Gary W. (1971) 5 Cal. 3d 296, 307 [96 Cal. Rptr. 1, 486 P.2d 1201]; People v. Feagley (1975) 14 Cal. 3d 338, 351 [121 Cal. Rptr. 509, 535 P.2d 373].)
"Indeed, a conservatee may be subjected to greater control of his or her life than one convicted of a crime" (Conservatorship of Roulet (1979) 23 Cal. 3d 219, 228 [152 Cal. Rptr. 425, 590 P.2d 1]) and the stigma of a civil commitment "'"could be as socially debilitating as that of a criminal conviction."'" (Id, at p. 229.)
Because these cases were seminal in proving that civil liberties were to remain the utmost important aspect of civil commitment cases, the appellate court found that in order to maintain the spirit of these cases, the court should strive to interpret the legislature in a manner that is more permissive than restrictive. As a result, the court found that adding jury instruction 8 was not an error of the trial court.
A fortiori the nondangerous person proposed for an LPS conservatorship subject to involuntary confinement should be, and is, entitled to a jury determination of all of the essential questions involved in a trial on the question of imposing such a conservatorship.
The court added that using the Buchanan case was error in itself because it would infringe upon the conservatee’s rights. The court reminds us that in accordance to § 5001 et seq the trier of fact needs to be able to view the entire case as a whole and not just parts in a vacuum. The other moving parts of the case include:
the willingness and capability of the proposed conservatee to voluntarily accept treatment and upon consideration of whether the nondangerous individual is capable of surviving safely in freedom by himself or with the help of willing and responsible family members, friends or other third parties. (SeeO'Connor v. Donaldson (1975) 422 U.S. 563, 573-576 [45 L. Ed. 2d 396, 405-407, 95 S. Ct. 2486].)
In a separate ruling, O'Connor v. Donaldson, supra, at page 576 [45 L.Ed.2d at page 407], establishes that "... a State cannot constitutionally confine without more a nondangerous individual who is capable of surviving safely in freedom by himself or with the help of willing and responsible family members or friends."
The court finds that the Buchanan court erred in interpreting the law by finding that “and more” meant excluding to be family, friends, or third agencies.
The public conservator attempted to explain that the LPS act
unambiguously limits a jury's inquiry into whether the respondent is, as a result of a mental disorder, incapable of providing herself with food, clothing or shelter, or alternately whether the elements of WIC section [124 Cal. App. 3d 327] 5008, subdivision (h)(2) fn. 5 are met," is inconsistent with his presentation of evidence in the trial court.
The appellate court cites appellant’s testimony during cross. The court reminds that just as the report may be submitted and examined during trial, so may the testimony of any witnesses. Even if the jury was not the trier of fact a judge would be. The public conservator investigator continued to testify citing that the LPS act was an act of delegation of judicial authority.
The conservatorship investigator continues to press the point that the LPS act in the early stages of the 14 day hearings and 72 hour hold is in a manner a form of delegation of decision making. First the doctor is tasked with determining whether a patient is a danger to themselves or others and should the doctor not be able to make such a choice a referral for under Welf and Inst Code § 5350 is made and the public conservatorship investigator gains that responsibility.
The court rejects the appellant’s argument in its entirety. The court holds that the early stages of a LPS hold are ancillary to a LPS conservatorship proceeding and are not judicial in nature. The appellate court returned to its original standing that the trial court did not make an error when allowing jury instruction 8.
A minor issue but one none the less was the matter of the conservatee trying to dismiss the appeal as moot. The conservatee argues that the previous ruling by the jury is legally analogous to an acquittal for a criminal offense and trying the matter again would run afoul of the double jeopardy doctrine. The court returns stating that LPS conservatees are not entitled to double jeopardy protection.
The court reminds the conservatee that even though LPS and penal code laws are often discussed together it does not necessarily mean the same rights are extended to the LPS act. The court finds such is necessary because penal code and LPS commitment both deal with matters involving deprivation of civil liberties. The LPS act, however, is more treatment and recovery oriented so applying the double jeopardy doctrine who would be wholly inappropriate.
To speak in terms of double jeopardy as a bar in the face of such possible future changes would be singularly inappropriate to the purposes and provisions of the LPS Act. [124 Cal. App. 3d 331]
Based on the preceding argument the court has laid forth, the appellate court dismissed the appeal and affirmed the order reversing the conservatorship.
Procedural Posture
Appellant public guardian challenged the dismissal by the Superior Court of Los Angeles County (California) of his petition to establish aconservatorship under the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act, Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 5001 et seq., and a temporary conservatorship with the power, among others, to involuntarily confine in a hospital respondent, a person claimed to be gravely disabled as a result of a mental disorder.
Overview
Appellant public guardian challenged the trial court's dismissal of his petition to establish a conservatorship under the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act (LPS Act), Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 5001 et seq., claiming that the trial court erred in giving jury instructions proposed by respondent, a person claimed to be gravely disabled as a result of a mental disorder, and refusing to give appellant's proposed jury instruction. The court affirmed the trial court's dismissal, rejecting appellant's contention and concluding that a person sought to be made a conservatee subject to involuntary confinement in a mental institution under the LPS Act was entitled to have a unanimous jury determination of all of the questions involved in the imposition of such a conservatorship, and not just on the issue of grave disability in the sense of whether he or she could safely survive in freedom and be provided food, clothing or shelter unaided by willing, responsible relatives, friends or appropriate third persons. The court also rejected respondent's contention that the jury verdict must have been regarded as the functional equivalent of an acquittal of a criminal offense for the purposes of due process.
Outcome
The court affirmed the trial court's order of dismissal and denied a motion to dismiss the appeal, finding that respondent, a person claimed to be gravely disabled as a result of a mental disorder, was entitled to have a unanimous jury determination of all of the questions involved in the imposition of a conservatorship under the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act and that double jeopardy did not apply to a determination at a conservatorship trial.